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The Future of Our Past: The Legal Mind and the
Legacy of Classical Common-Law Thoughtt
DONALD

H. GJERDINGEN*

I. OUR COMMON PAST
One hundred and fifty years ago, Classical common-law thought-the form
of legal thought that dominated the Civil War-to-1937 period in American
law-had yet to appear. One hundred years ago, Classical common-law
thought was in place and formed the basis for traditional legal education. Fifty
years ago, Classical common-law thought was all but dead. We have yet to
figure out why
The purpose of this Essay is a modest one. I simply want to argue that how
we, as lawyers, approach our future is very much dependent on our ability to
understand how Classical common-law thought came about and why it
remains vestigially so much a part of our legal culture today The lessons for
the future of our past are three. First, Classical common-law thought was
more than cases and doctrines. At its fullest, it represented a comprehensive,
deep, and interlocking set of intellectual, political, and cultural connections
that influenced virtually every aspect of law during the Civil War-to-1937
period, from Constitutional Law to Conflict of Laws, and defined the common
dimensions of legal thought. Second, much of the current unrest in legal
scholarship can be understood only by tracing the rise and fall of Classical
common-law thought and by understanding why some of the earliest and
deepest memories of our professional lives have, in recent years, become

t © Copyright 1993 by Donald H. Gjerdingen. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
As usual, Kan and Erick kept me suitably silly; Kendra kept me suitably sane. They also made this
worth doing. My colleagues Steve Conrad, John Scanlan, and Susan Williams were kind enough to tell
me when my words stumbled or my ideas dimmed. A lot of other people helped just by making this
law school a nice place to be. John Schlegel and Bruce Ackerman had the good sense to tell me when
I was wrong. Everyone else had the good sense to ignore me.
This Essay summarizes a long work in progress. I present this simply as one way to look at things.
I acknowledge that others (including legal historians) may see things differently. My point is not to
prove anyone wrong. There are many ways to look at law and'the work of lawyers. I just think that this
is one of them.
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some of the most often challenged. Third, as we look to the future of legal
thought and consider what it may bring us, the existence of Classical
common-law thought offers some important and under-studied lessons about
how lawyers respond to and, in turn, interact with the political and cultural
worlds around them.
My argument will proceed in several stages. First, I want to set out the
dominant political model of the Civil War-to-1937 era, the vision of society
it fostered, and the form of dispute it legitimated. Next, I want to show how
these features combined to create constraints that shaped public dialogue,
particularly what questions could be asked and what could be talked about.
Once I have done that, I want to talk about how the political model and its
accompanying dialogic constraints influenced the work of lawyers. My next
goal is to show how these features combined to create the special mosaic of
Classical common-law thought and, in particular, the implicit cognitive maps
that united and informed the work of lawyers. Finally, I conclude with some
of the lessons that we might use from this understanding of Classical
common-law thought as we look towards our collective future.
II. NORMATIVE VISIONS, POLITICAL FORMS
My argument can be illustrated by a series of charts and the relationships
among them. Together, these charts present key elements that have shaped the
nature of law, legal education, and the role of lawyers in American life.
A. Political Questions, PoliticalAnswersThe Substance of PoliticalDialogue
My starting point is the political culture of the Civil War-to-1937 period.
The political structure during this period represented a unified and coherent
structure-one that I have termed "common-law liberalism."' The substance
of common-law liberalism can be summarized in chart form in the following
terms, which I will call Box 2 and label "Political Culture."

1. Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Futureof Legal Scholarship and the Searchfor a Modern Theory
of Law, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 428-32 (1986).
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POLITICAL CULTURE
2

" night watchman state
" transactional justice
" status quo prima facie just

" faith m the market
" public/private distinction
" individualism
" personal autonomy/independent

" social structure not subject to political
control (e.g., family off limits; private
groups)

" reinforce dominant social expectations
based on idealized concepts of role
" no redistribution of wealth
" moralistic; individual responsibility
* rights preexist the state (fencing in)

In the world of common-law liberalism, the status quo is prima facie
legitimate and the state has no special role to play Transactional justice
dominates. If achieved through the use of historically correct moves, the
status quo and the expectations associated with it reflect the desired state of
affairs. Autonomous individuals make bargains with each other, governed by
general free-market principles tempered by the application of idealized
dominant social standards. Each person is assumed to have certain rights that
preexist the state and set baseline boundaries. The role of the state is to police
individual moves within these boundaries without interfering with the exercise
of individual autonomy
Common-law liberalism creates a clear negative and a clear positive role for
the state, both of which are linked to upholding existing social and private
power arrangements. On the one hand, certain pockets of private power are
deemed beyond the reach of the state. Baselines achieved by historically
correct means define proper "private" starting points, just as proper "private"
moves between individuals are defined by an assumed equality of wills. The
state may neither upset these private baselines nor deny this assumed equality
of wills. As such, the state may not redistribute wealth, change bargaining
power, or regulate prices. These limits are natural and akin to the law of
gravity, something it would be both silly and dangerous for the state to try to
change.
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On the other hand, other forms of private power provide "public" standards
for the state to emulate and reinforce. Patterns and distributions achieved by
historically correct moves define proper public ending points. If each
individual move, separately considered, complies with the tenets of transactional justice, the overall societal pattern and distribution that results from the
sum total of these individual moves is not open to review In turn, the
dominant social expectations derived from the existing economic, social, and
political arrangements provide publicly enforceable standards of conduct.
These standards reinforce existing private power arrangements-and hence the
resulting distribution of political, economic, and social power in society The
resulting public standards often embody idealized and group-based concepts
of race, class, role, and gender. These majoritarian (sometimes ruthlessly
majoritarian) standards provide a significant basis for the imposition of public
standards by the state, ostensibly as the accumulated product of mere
individual preferences.
B. The Procedure of Politics, the Politics of Procedure
Predictably, common-law liberalism would generate a particular type of
dispute.2 Why disputes take place, what they are about, and who controls
them reflect the basic normative assumptions of common-law liberalism. The
resulting form of dispute reflects and reinforces the deep assumptions of
common-law liberalism. The dispute form in common-law liberalism can be
summarized in another chart, which I will name Box 3 and label "Form of
Dispute." Added to Box 2, it takes the following form:

2. See id. at 429-30. The standard cite for forms of dispute is Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1282-92 (1976), followed by Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme
Court 1978 Term-Foreward: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I, 17-28 (1979); and Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality ofLaw, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). The dispute
is not about the existence of such forms. About that, all seem to agree. My difference with these people
is (a) what gives rise to such forms, (b) why the forms changed, (c) how such forms are linked to
substantive political visions, and (d) how this affects public dialogue. I believe now, as I said then, that
politics and particular points in American history have a lot more to do with the generation of these
forms than Chayes, Fuller, and Fiss may think, and that natural law has a lot less to do with it than
Weinrib may think.

1993]

COMMON-LAW THOUGHT

POLITICAL CULTURE

"
•
"
"
•
"
"
•
•
"
•
*

night watchman state
transactional justice
status quo prima facie just
faith in the market
public/private distinction
individualism
personal autonomy/independent
social structure not subject to
political control (e.g., family
off limits; private groups)
reinforce dominant social
expectations based on idealized
concepts of role
no redistribution of wealth
moralistic; individual responsibility
rights preexist the state (fencing in)

FORM OF DISPUTE

3
" "histoncal" validity of individual
moves; so long as each is valid,
resulting distribution is "just"
" if no one complains, no problem
exists
" people who complain say what is
wrong in court
" bipolar
• retrospective
* administered on case-by-case basis
* state judged by same standards as
private person
• individual instances of "deviant
conduct"

The relationship between Box 2 and Box 3 is the relationship between
substance and procedure. The substance of Box 2 legitimates the procedure
of Box 3. The normative vision of common-law liberalism-and hence the
basic rules of conduct in society-is grounded in transactional justice. In a
transactional justice political culture, disputes could be expected to be bipolar,
retrospective, case-by-case disputes, typically about individual instances of
deviant conduct. In part, this is because transactional justice makes those
types of disputes more important than others. It is also in part because
transactional justice-with its ban on redistribution and political alteration of
the social structure-virtually rules out the possibility of group- or classbased, prospective disputes.
In turn, the procedure of Box 3 reinforces the substance of Box 2. The
procedure of Box 3 filters out questions that may challenge what is already
assumed in Box 2. For example, by treating a dispute between the state and
a private person as the functional equivalent of a dispute between two
individuals, the procedure of Box 3 reinforces the substantive political
doctrine of Box 2 that the state has no particular responsibility for or special
power to change the status quo. Similarly, because common-law liberalism
emphasizes personal autonomy and the validity of baseline, holdings, the
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normative focal point-predictably-would be the validity of each individual
move. The resulting bipolar dispute form, in turn, effectively cuts off
questions about the validity of the political, economic, and social power that
emerge from the total sum of all such individual moves. In turn, this
exclusion of dialogue reinforces and validates the initial assumptions about
personal autonomy and the validity of baseline holdings.
III. POLITICAL TALK, POLITICAL VISIONS
The form and nature of public dialogue in common-law liberalism also
follows predictable patterns. What can (or cannot) be talked about, what
questions can be asked, and what will be listened to also follow predictable
patterns. Together, these patterns structure, shape, and validate public
discourse.
A. Gidelian Worlds' and the Substance of Silence
Within common-law liberalism, certain deep assumptions simply "go
without saying." They are not talked about simply because they are already
assumed. For example, common-law liberalism takes as given that the market
works, that the status quo is just, and that the state acts best as a night
watchman. In the context of common-law liberalism, these propositions are
noncontestable. It is not that such proposals-in the abstract-are easy, clear,
or obvious, or that humans are incapable of contesting them. It is just that
such propositions cannot easily be debated or plainly seen from inside
common-law liberalism. They are more clearly seen and more easily talked
about from afar. In this way, what is not talked about and why determines
more about the nature and direction of what ultimately is talked about than the
substance of the resulting public dialogue itself. Silence has substance.

3. By G6delian worlds, I simply mean the general idea, borrowed from Kurt G6del's work in math
theory, that (a) we construct our worlds-both theoretical and real-out of nested systems of thought
that fold into each other; (b) each system is based on certain axiomatic assumptions that cannot be
proved within the system they create; (c) multiple worlds, each consistent in its own way, can be
constructed; and (d)such systems are self-referencing. See DOUGLAs R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER,
BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979); ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF

(1958). A version accessible to lawyers can be found in John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some
Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992).

As should be evident from this Essay, I believe that such ideas can be applied on a far grander scale
and in far different ways than lawyers have yet been willing to talk about.
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B. Contours of Contestability
What is seen and what is not seen determine what is open for debate and
what is not. The deep assumptions of what "goes without saying" set dialogic
boundary lines that open some topics for debate and close off others. The
same assumptions that separate what is talked about from what is "just
understood" also shape what can be argued about and what cannot. On one
level, they tell us what need not be talked about (for example, noncontestable
issues such as whether the market works or whether equality of wills applies).
They also tell us what cannot be talked about, either because it would contest
something that is noncontestable (for example, whether it is preferable for the
state to redistribute wealth) or because the categories used do not allow it to
be asked (for example, equality of wills blocks talk about inequality of
bargaining power).
In a related way, this also establishes what questions are "hard" (that is,
contestable) and what questions are "easy" (that is, noncontestable), as well
as what questions are "relevant." The substance of hard questions tracks what
is contestable once what goes without saying is in place. Some hard questions
represent conflict between accepted principles or categories. For example, if
consensual moves are founded on autonomy and equality of will, an
agreement based on a mistake presents a problem. Upholding the agreement
could be said to violate the will of one of the parties, but the same could be
said for not upholding it. At the same time, a mistake itself could be labeled
as an example of a false will (and thus bad) or full autonomy (and thus good).
Other hard questions represent marginal application of accepted principles or
categories (for example, exactly where do we cross the line from private to
public). Easy questions, in contrast, represent the substance of what is already
assumed, along with core applications of accepted categories.
The sum total of what it is proper to talk about under these various rules
constitutes the substantive body of what is "relevant." Talk of other topics or
other categories is not taken seriously It would not do, for example, to argue
about inequality of bargaining power once equality of wills is already
assumed. Such a question is not proper and is not relevant. If asked, it need
not be answered.
C. The Generation of Dialogue and the Shaping of Questions
Together, what goes without saying and the resulting contours of contestability shape the rules of debate. Inside common-law liberalism, what is talked
about is linked to what the deep assumptions of common-law liberalism make
it important to talk about. Once in place, common-law liberalism makes some
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questions more important than others. The contours of what is talked about
are derived from the questions, topics, and situations that common-law
liberalism makes important. People ask the questions that the accepted
categories lead them to ask (for example, what are dominant social expectations for women generally), they debate the issues the accepted categories
need them to debate (for example, what are manifestations of equality of will
in the world), and they learn what common-law liberalism makes it important
for them to know (for example, what are proper and improper "moves").
IV THE WORK OF LAWYERS
Given this general framework, the work of lawyers centers on three related
tasks: (1) creation of mediating concepts to implement common-law liberalism
and carry it out in everyday life; (2) resolution of the expected disputes of
common-law liberalism; and (3) legitimation of the deep assumptions of
common-law liberalism. Each is worth special mention.
A. Mediating Concepts and Overlays
Common-law liberalism makes some questions and some problems more
important than others. Lawyers, to be successful, must provide ways to talk
about them. To the extent that lawyers provide categories and techniques that
assist in that task, they provide an important public function and increase the
power and prestige of their craft. If lawyers help people talk about what needs
to be talked about, they will be listened to.
Law does not provide this function directly Instead, it creates "mediating
concepts." These implement what "goes without saying" into the texture of
daily life. Mediating concepts themselves often are perceived as independent
concepts, understandable on their own terms. At the same time, they reflect
and serve as carriers for the politics of common-law liberalism. Whatever
mediating concepts the legal culture creates must be consistent with both the
substance and procedure of common-law liberalism. The mediating concepts
must respond to both, track both, and shadow both. Mediating concepts make
up much of the substantive body of the law Examples might be such legal
notions as "property" or "fault."
Lawyers gain legitimacy by mapping onto the basic features of common-law
liberalism. On the one hand, mediating concepts allow the deep assumptions
of common-law liberalism to be implemented, applied, and discussed in a
convenient and facile way In the context of common-law liberalism, this
supplies the concepts (and hence lawyers) with legitimacy On the other hand,
mediating concepts gain legitimacy by not talking about common-law
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liberalism directly, hence serving to make the deep assumption of commonlaw liberalism seem all the more natural and legitimate. Thus, while the
mediating concepts must be consistent with the dominant political vision, the
best ones do not use the language of politics. In this sense, they serve as
overlays-ideas or concepts that are independent in their own right, yet
silently responsive to the larger as well as the smaller politics in the world.
B. Dispute Resolution Function
On a basic level, law must deal with the inevitable disputes that arise in the
day-to-day world of common-law liberalism. Law must respond to the
expected arguments and charges about improper boundary crossings associated
with transactional justice. To maintain public order and to confirm the
legitimacy of common-law liberalism, these matters must be satisfactorily
resolved.
On another and more fundamental level, law must resolve the "hard" public
questions about the general content and shape of common-law liberalism and
about how to treat the particular gaps, ambiguities, or conflicts in the deep
assumptions of common-law liberalism. Such issues typically arise in what are
treated as landmark decisions or in what are perceived as the pressing public
issues of the day
C. Legitimation Function
Law and lawyers also fulfill certain legitimation functions. Ideally, they
create, use, and manipulate mediating concepts and resolve the various
disputes that common-law liberalism places before them without drawing the
legitimacy of the basic normative vision of common-law liberalism or its
basic form of dispute into question. Some of this is done by linking mediating
concepts (and hence the political visions they carry with them) with other
basic sources of legitimacy in everyday life. For example, this could be done
by linking the political issue of liability to the complementary concept of fault
in the everyday life of lay people. Some of this is also done by mapping
mediating concepts onto the deep assumptions of common-law liberalism
without directly invoking the contestable language of politics. This makes
common-law liberalism seem natural. Lawyers also legitimize the existing
political culture by enforcing the dialogic constraints of common-law
liberalism and its dispute forms. This directs public dialogue toward those
forms and questions that implicitly support the deep assumptions of commonlaw liberalism and away from those that might challenge what went without
saying.
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D Law, Lawyers, and Common-Law LiberalismA First Approximation
The argument so far may be summarized in the following chart by adding
Box 1, labeled "Legal Culture," to the earlier two boxes.

LEGAL CULTURE

*autonomous

* formalism/positivism
* case-by-case
* taxonomic/in-outlyes-no/
on-off/win-lose
Sterritorial
* precedent
* fault/consent/causation
* classical common-law
categories
* single, right answer
ilntuitionism

POLITICAL CULTURE

2
" night watchman state
" transactional justice
* status quo prima facie
just
" faith in the market
" public/private
distinction
" individualism
" personal autonomy/
independent
" social structure not
subject to political
control (e.g.,
family off limits;
private groups)
" reinforce dominant
social expectations
based on idealized
concepts of role
" no redistribution of
wealth
" moralistic; individual
responsibility
• rights preexist the state
(fencing in)

FORM OF DISPUTE

3
* "historical" validity of
individual moves; so
long as each is valid,
resulting distribution

is "just"
* if no one complains, no
problem exists
* people who complain
say what is wrong in
court
" bipolar
" retrospective
" administered on caseby-case basis
• state judged by same
standards as private
person
" individual instances of
"deviant conduct"

Given the relationship between Box 2 and Box 3, the role of the legal
culture-subject always to the general constraints that attend public dialogue
inside common-law liberalism-is threefold: first, to ask the kinds of
questions that are important in Box 2; second, to resolve the disputes of Box
3, and third, to do so without drawing into question "what goes without
saying" in either.
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V. THE SPECIAL MOSAIC OF THE LEGAL MIND AND
CLASSICAL COMMON-LAW THOUGHT

Classical common-law thought is a special mosaic. While a first approximation can be assembled from a few principles, the precise lines and exact
texture of Classical common-law thought emerge only after several other
elements are brought into play Each additional element supports and folds
into the others in powerful yet often silent ways. Once together, the end
product is clear, precise, and cohesive.
A. Element One-The Constitution, the Civil War,
and the Three Spheres
The Civil War created a series of foundational changes in the American
political structure, particularly with respect to deep assumptions about the
structure of federalism and the role of the federal government in the
protection of individual rights vis-i-vis the states. Resolution of this problem
became a central concern for the legal culture. The ideological solution, as
others have pointed out,4 was the conceptualization of three separate and
independent spheres, largely analogous to the dominions of three separate
property owners. One sphere belonged to the federal government, a second to
the state government, and a third to individuals. Graphically, it could be
presented as follows:

4. See Duncan Kennedy, Towardan HistoricalUnderstandingofLegal Consciousness: The Case of
ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3 (Steven Spitzer ed., 1980). I

would interpret all of this in a different way than Kennedy, though. I agree that the three-sphere
structure that Kennedy sets out plays a key role in Classical common-law thought. From here on, I
suspect that we part company. I do not believe that he would agree with what has been said so far in
this Essay, and I do not believe that he would agree with much of what comes after this. See infra note
33 and accompanying text (discussing other differences about reasons for the demise of spheres).
One of the prominent issues on which I disagree with Kennedy would be how I would explain the
coherence as well as the exact content of the spheres. I believe that common-law liberalism was a
coherent political structure while it was in place. In contrast, Kennedy sees the entire period as far less
coherent and laden with any number of opposing and irreconcilable distinctions. See, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) [hereinafter
Form and Substance].

As should be evident from what has come so far in this Essay and from what will follow, I also
believe that Classical common-law thought is far more coherent and that the various pieces blend
together in far more exacting ways and in larger themes than legal scholars of all stripes have yet been
willing to explore.
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Ultimately, the three spheres serve as a critical feature of Classical
common-law thought. For example, from this construct alone it would follow
that:
- Power cannot be shared (since within each sphere, the respective actor has
autonomy).
" There can be only one location for each power, thing, or person.
" Categorization is important, as are bright-line demarcations that emphasize
in/out, yes/no, and right/wrong (from the need to locate and place things in or out
of one sphere or the other).
- The public/private distinction is assumed (from the assumed borders between the
individual and the state).
• A single form of legal actor is assumed (from the assumed equality of the
spheres and the assumption that within each sphere autonomy is complete).
: Each actor stands on an equal footing with the other (since each sphere is
separate and equal, and since each stands on an equal plane free of hierarchy).
B. Element Two-The Boundaries of Common-Law Liberalism,
the "Yes" and "No" of Government, and the
Substance of the Spheres
Taken alone, the three spheres presuppose clean, precise boundaries for each
of the three actors and one location for each power or thing. What is given
to one is denied to the others. The critical task, therefore, is to know what to
place in each sphere. To continue the process, we need to know how to sort
out what is placed in one sphere or another. Once completed, this categorization process determines the substantive content of each of the spheres.
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Here the substantive politics of common-law liberalism supplies the answer.
The specific content of the respective spheres tracks what the state can or
cannot do according to the tenets of common-law liberalism. The Federal and
the State spheres are placeholders for what the state can do. In turn, the
Individual sphere is a placeholder for what the state cannot do.
With respect to individuals, the state cannot do the following: (1) redistribute wealth; (2) change bargaining power; (3) regulate the market; (4) interfere
with the power exercised within existing units of the social structure (for
example, family, political parties, bureaucracies); or (5) concern itself with
the validity of the social structure. This supplies the content of the Individual
sphere and the substance of what is "private."
In contrast, the state can do the following: (1) regulate for the public good,
typically defined as projects used by or open to the public; (2) regulate for the
general health of the public, typically defined as safeguarding the public from
physical danger; (3) reinforce accepted moral values of dominant social
groups; and (4) reinforce dominant social roles. This supplies the substantive
content of the Federal and State spheres, as well as denominates what is
"public."
One additional distinction needs to be made. This might be termed the
federalism test. While common-law liberalism makes deep assumptions about
the state, here there are two different state entities-the federal and the state
governments. Under the tenets of common-law liberalism, both have the same
general powers (what the government can do) and both have the same general
limits (what the government cannot do). This alone does not distinguish one
from the other. How do we know what belongs in the Federal sphere (that is,
what the federal government can regulate according to the tenets of commonlaw liberalism) and what belongs in the State sphere, knowing that what is
given to one is necessarily denied the other and that where one ends the other
begins?
Perhaps because of the strong connections in common-law liberalism
between "physical" manifestations of autonomy (that is, property) and
"physical" manifestations of boundary crossings, the answer here is based on
whether a physical "thing" is moving or not. Physical "things" are in the
Federal sphere while they are moving between state boundaries. Whatever
happens before these "things" start to move on their physical journey or after
these "things" stop moving is in the State sphere. Under this standard, the
regulatory power of the federal government vis-A-vis the states is limited.
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C. Element Three-The Common-Law Mind and
the Constitution-The General Contours of Law
Given these three spheres, the political content of each, and the boundaries
between them, some general deductions about the nature and contours of law
can be made. Based on the previous two elements, it was predictable that the
law of the period would involve: (1) predominately state law, because of the
limited role of the federal government; (2) disputes of a bipolar nature
because of the general transactional justice basis of common-law liberalism;
and (3) an emphasis on courts and case law because the substantive limits on
state action (such as no distribution of wealth or regulation of the market)
assured only a limited role for statutes and administrative action.
D Element Four-Langdell, TransactionalJustice,
and the Case Method
In this context, the role of the legal culture stands out in sharp relief. Given
the previous three elements, the legal culture would clearly need to deal with
transactional justice, bipolar disputes, and dominant social expectations. It
would also be expected to deal with a world where power was more with
courts than legislatures and more with states than the federal government.
Finally, it would be expected to assume and to look for consensus rules and
uniform standards. Given these tasks, the response of the legal culture was
particularly effective. That response was the case method, Socratic dialogue,
and Langdellian orthodoxy '
In such a world, teaching law by cases made eminent sense. It made sense
because in a world where the state could not redistribute wealth, regulate the
market, or change bargaining power, courts could play an important role, but
administrative agencies or legislatures could not. It made sense because in a
world where the power of the federal government was limited, state case law
constituted the bulk of law And perhaps it made the most sense of all in a
world where transactional justice formed the substance of law and bipolar,
retrospective individual disputes about instances of deviant conduct formed
the procedure.
In such a world, Christopher Columbus Langdell could succeed. He
succeeded in part because he was at Harvard and he succeeded in part because
his ideas paralleled the dominant intellectual model of nineteenth-century
5. One of the best descriptions of the field structure of Classical common-law thought is Thomas
C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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science. 6 But more than anything else, he succeeded because he did a better
job of allowing law and lawyers to do what they needed to do in the political
world and the Constitutional setting in which they found themselves.
VI. THE FINAL PRODUCT
What, then, was the final product like? Once these elements were placed
together, the resulting mosaic of Classical common-law thought dominated all
law, both public and private, both state and federal. In turn, it defined what
lawyers did, what they talked about, and how they were trained.
7
A. The Common-Law Mind and the Constitution

1. Public Law
The content of Constitutional Law is largely defined by the answer to one
question: "When, if ever, is judicial review proper'?" During the Civil War-to1937 period, that question is answered solely by reference to the three spheres
and their content. The task that falls to the Court, and defines its role, is
policing the boundaries of the spheres, consistent with the tenets and dialogic
constraints of common-law liberalism. The Court repels incursions by one of
the actors into the sphere of another, adjudicates boundary disputes between
the actors, and resolves the "hard questions" of common-law liberalism
implicated in those disputes.
This scheme determined when the Court would review state or federal
legislation and how it would do it. Under this model, judicial review would
be performed in two typical situations. The first would be the policing
function of keeping each sphere free from the imperialistic efforts of the
others. For example, the Court would repulse federal incursion into state
territory or state incursions into individual territory '

6. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HIsToRY 20-62 (1980)
(discussing torts and 19th-century science); Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23
AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 329 (1979) (discussing case method and 19th-century science).
7. I would hope that this is at least a partial answer to the question posed by John Schlegel: "Just
what part has constitutional law played in forming the legal twentieth century'?" John H. Schlegel, The
Line Between Casenote and History, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 969, 977 (1988).

8. The most famous case is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-65 (1905) (State incursion into
Individual sphere). A sampling of other varieties of boundary crossings would include Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (Federal incursion into State and Individual spheres); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-80 (1908) (Federal incursion into Individual sphere); and Collector v. Day,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124-26 (1871) (Federal invasion of State sphere).
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The second would be the definition function. This would involve marginal
application of accepted elements of common-law liberalism9 or its related
mediating concepts," or the resolution of definitional issues tied to the
precise placement of boundary lines separating the spheres." This also could
take the form of landmark cases linked to the recognition of significant

At first, many of these were minor boundary disputes. Later the Court faced (and similarly repulsed)
wholesale attacks on the foundations of Classical common-law thought and the role of the Court in
monitonng it. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936) (concerning frontal
attack on spheres, what states can and cannot do, and use of "things in movement" to determine
boundary between Federal and State spheres).
9. For example, once it is taken as given that the state can regulate on the basis of "public"
matters-typically those which pose a physical threat to all members of the public (such as disease or
safety) or which are physically open to the public at large (such as public buildings or streets)-then
it should not come as a surprise that businesses that historically are monopolies, physically open to the
public at large and that must serve all members of the public (such as ferries, mills, bridges, and
turnpikes), are within the power of the state to regulate. What then becomes a "hard" question is
whether a business is like a traditional category when it is something new, such as a grain elevator, see
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-30 (1877) (yes), or a broker for theatre tickets, Tyson & Bro. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 439-42 (1927) (no).
10. For example, if "commerce" is envisioned as a "thing" that moves between states, then one of
the easy cases of the period is that a train presently in motion over interstate rail lines is commerce;
however, one of the hard questions may be whether the "thing" is still commerce if it is detoured in the
middle of the trip. See, e.g., Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922) (holding that
logs temporarily detained by boom to prevent destruction were still deemed to be in transit); General
Oil Co. v. Cram, 209 U.S. 211, 228-31 (1908) (finding that oil separated into other cars for reshipping
was no longer in transit). If the "thing" being transported between states is capable of self-locomotion,
so much the better. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 514-17 (1922) (cows); Kelley v.
Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903) (sheep).
11. For example, once it is taken as given that the state may not regulate the basic bargain of
employment except in those few instances that "everybody knows" are "dangerous," and coal mining
is understood to be such a "dangerous" profession, then it should not be strange that someone might
argue that another occupation (say, working in a bakery) that is also usually performed under "dark
conditions" (that is, at night) and that involves hard physical labor under conditions where large amounts
of "dust" are inhaled might also be dangerous. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54-60 (Peckham, J.)
(finding that bakers are not like coal miners) and id. at 59 ('To the common understanding the trade
of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one.") with id. at 70-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting that bakers are like coal miners). In so arguing, the Justices did not question the existence of
the three spheres, the general content of those spheres, or what the deep assumptions of common-law
liberalism determined was relevant. They disagreed only about their particular application in this
individual case, which was, in the end, a minor boundary dispute between the state and individual
spheres.
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elements of common-law liberalism," or the resolution3 of "hard questions"
about the general structure of common-law liberalism.'
Throughout the entire process, the Court would also enforce the dialogic
constraints associated with common-law liberalism. If a party tried to contest
what went without saying, the Court need not listen. If a lawyer tried to argue
that the state had the power to change bargaining power, the Court need only
invoke "freedom of contract"' 4 or allude to the obvious impropriety of "a
labor law, pure and simple."'15 If a lawyer tried to argue that redistribution
of wealth is permitted, the Court need only say "class legislation" 6 or "due
process."' 7 And if a lawyer trd to challenge existing forms of majoritarian
power in the social structure, the Court need only disclaim jurisdiction over
"social, as distinguished from political equality,"" cite "the law of the
Creator,"1 9 or defer to the "established usages, customs and traditions of the
people."2
The content of the spheres is better known by the mediating concepts the
Court used to label them. The content of the Individual sphere became Due
Process (and to a lesser extent Takings or Contract Clause). The content of
12. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (regarding role of state vis-a-vis market);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (concerning legitimacy of dominant social expectations);
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (finding no redistribution of wealth); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (discussing respective roles of federal government, state
government, and individual); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (regarding use of
ideal role and group-based characteristics for women).
13. The first significant attempt was The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(discussing role of Court, place of markets, and respective role of state versus federal governments after
Civil War).
14. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1915).
15. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57 ("The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure
and simple, may be dismissed in a few words.").
16. See, e.g., Pollock, 157 U.S. at 596 (Field, J., concurring) (income tax), overruled by South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610-18 (1936) (minimum
wage).
18. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
19. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurnng)
(explaining why women may not practice law); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of the
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,49 (1889) (finding Mormonism "contrary to the spirit
of Chrstianity").
20. See, e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (explaining segregation); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 25 ("Mere discriminations on account of race or color [are] not regarded as [violations of the
13th Amendment].').
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the Federal or State sphere became Police Power.2' In the disputes between
the Federal and the State spheres, what was in the State sphere was labeled
Tenth Amendment and what was in the Federal sphere was labeled Commerce
(and to a lesser extent Spending Clause, Taxing Clause, or federal police
power), just as what happened before or after physical things moved was
labeled Manufacturing.
2. Private Law
While large areas of law were left to the states and to the courts, the law
of each state would conform to the pattern already set in place and enforced
by the Supreme Court. While each state was allowed to experiment, it was
allowed to do so only within the context of police power as defined by the
Court and only so long as it avoided due process violations as defined by the
Court. While states were free to develop the fine points of common law at the
bottom, the big points were already set at the top. The basic rules of contracts
and torts were already set by police power and due process. The basic rules
of conflict of laws and jurisdiction were already set by the assumptions of the
three spheres and the corollary that, just as each power can be in only one
place at a time, so too can a tort happen in only one place or a person be in
only one place at a time.22 The basic forms of procedure were already set by
the politics of common-law liberalism, and the basic forms of evidence and
legal method were already set by the dialogic constraints about what could or
could not be talked about.
Since this entire interlocking structure was part of constitutional law, these
ideas provided the controlling assumptions of the period. All the law of the
period would be consistent with this pattern, whether practiced at the federal
or the state level, or whether practiced in one state rather than another. The
rules, top to bottom, were the same.

21. As largely codified in such works as ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904); WILLIAM P PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW
OF OVERRULING NECESSITY (1894); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT
(1886).
22. The best treatment of the relationship between these doctrines and the development of Classical
common-law thought is Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-FederalistTale ofPersonalJurisdiction,63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 257, 315-42 (1990).
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B. Common-Law Categories and Mediating Concepts
During the period of Classical common-law thought, most of what lawyers
knew as the law, as well as the categories they learned, manipulated, and used
in the daily practice of their craft, were mediating concepts. The seemingly
autonomous, self-referencing system they created legitimated the deep
political assumptions of common-law liberalism and elevated the role of
lawyers in public life. The mediating concepts folded into the significant
debates of public life as well as the fine-grained texture of the disputes of
daily life and provided a common language for talking about both.
Because of the transactional justice political assumptions of common-law
liberalism, mediating concepts such as property, criminal law, contract, and
torts could claim to be basic, elementary categories. Combined, they shadow
and track elementary features of transactional justice, such as establishment
of baselines (property), consensual moves based on equality of will (contract
and property), and market transactions (contract), as well as improper
boundary crossings (criminal law, property and torts). In such a world, it
should not have been a surprise that torts 23 and contracts 24 only appeared
as special legal categories after the Civil War. In addition, in creating
mediating concepts to shadow the world of common-law liberalism-filled as
it was with real or imagined boundaries and dominant social expectations and
idealized social roles-using categorization, relying on territoriality, and
assuming the existence of single, right answers made sense.
Once the mediating concepts created by the legal culture are accepted (that.
is, they go without saying in the legal culture), an additional round of dialogic
constraints would be expected to exist and be played out inside the legal
culture. These constraints would involve similar issues of contestability,
relevancy, and hard and easy questions, but would be played out in the
narrower context of the mediating concepts themselves (for example, marginal
application of existing categories or conflicts between categories). Resolution
of these issues at one level or another would involve academics as well as
practicing lawyers. The work product this produced would constitute most of
the content of the law reviews and judicial reports of the period.

23. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 3-19 (discussing development of conceptual category of torts after
Civil War); G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 213 (1978) (describing movement from forms of action to general tort duties owed to public).
24. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-48 (1977); GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 5-34 (1974) (describing movement from status-bound obligations to general

theory of contracts).
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C. Law Schools and Legal Education
The period of Classical common-law thought was the generative period for
conventional legal education. The techniques and tasks of legal academics and
legal education folded into other features of Classical common-law thought.
A partial list could include some of the following:
Cases and TransactionalJustice. At the very time that the intellectual
structure of Classical common-law thought was being established, the case
method played a critical role by establishing case-by-case assessment of
individual moves as a dominant concern of the legal culture. In so doing, the
legal culture was able to train those entering the profession in a perspective
and in a technique of argument important in a transactional justice political
system.

Cases, Socratic Dialogue, and Dialogic Constraints. The conventional
wisdom overlooks the political connection between the case method and the
dialogic constraints of common-law liberalism. Langdell and his method
succeeded because it fulfilled the special role that common-law liberalism
created for the legal culture. To a significant extent, the case method served "
as a filter on the types of issues that could become important and also
matched the professional perspective of the legal culture to distinctions of
importance in the political structure. Questions not easily structured within the
confines of bipolar retrospective dispute (such as the legitimacy of the
existing social structure) could not be raised.
The Work of Legal Academics. The best work of the best academics in the
early years of Classical common-law thought was the creation of mediating
concepts. 25 For example, Langdell's lasting legacy was not the few crabbed
articles he authored, but the conceptual framework he created for what turned
out to be the dominant mediating concept of the era-Classical common-law
contracts. While we should avoid the easy tendency to endow Langdell
retrospectively with the good sense to do something famous-good timing and
dumb luck certainly played a role, too 26 -the ultimate political and cultural

25. While I am not sure if he would agree with my reading of what was happening here, I find John
Schlegel's work on the social history of legal education largely consistent with this premise. See John
H. Schlegel, Between the HarvardFoundersand the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization
of the American Law Professor,35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1985); John H. Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy
or, The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT B. STEVENS,
LAW SCHOOL. LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s (1983), and
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUC. IN LAW, LAW AND LEARNING: REPORT TO THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA

(1983)).

26. See Chase, supra note 6. Among other things, Chase details the significance of Charles Elliott's
being president of Harvard at the time and how the case method proposed by Langdell happened to
reinforce Elliott's aims of promoting 19th-century science as a legitimating pnnciple for university work.
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reasons behind the acceptance and success of what he did are clear.27 After
this first wave, work by legal academics centered on the "hard questions" of
already accepted mediating concepts.

VII. THE FUTURE OF OUR PAST
What, then, is the future of our past? In closing, I can offer a few questions
to fill our lifetimes.

A. Legal Theory Matters
That such a mosaic did exist matters. If the mosaic of Classical commonlaw thought has any validity, then Legal Theory" matters. Legal Theory
matters for academics, it matters for law students, and it matters for practicing
lawyers. Part of the tradition we all received was that the law was autonomous and belonged to lawyers. We were told that while there was a place for

"policy" in what we did, there was no place for politics, and while there was

a place for legal history, there was no place for the historical contingency of
the law Torts, contract, and property were presented to us as Platonic forms,
fixed and eternal, rational and right.
The mosaic of Classical common-law thought calls all this into question, but
not in a way we should fear. The mosaic of Classical common-law thought
calls into question the strict autonomy of the law, but it does not call into
question the importance of what lawyers do. The mosaic may call into
question the ritualistic use of the trappings of Langdellian orthodoxy, but it
does not call into question the importance of understanding how lawyers are
trained to think and what that has to do with the world around them.

Id.

27. A complete study of Classical common-law thought would also benefit from studying how the
taxonomic character of 19th-century science folded into the need for categorization implicit in the
structure of the three separate spheres. See, e.g., WHiTE, supra note 6, at 20-62 (discussing taxonomic
structure of 19th-century science).
28. By "Legal Theory," I mean to use a specific term of art. I earlier used the term "Legal Theory
Movement" to describe a particular group of scholars prominent in the New Scholarship that was
distinct from the Conventionalism, associated with the Old Scholarship and from Critical Legal Studies
(CLS). See Gjerdingen, supra note 1,at 398-408. I also use "Legal Theory" in the sense of equating it
generally with the New Scholarship. Others use the term in a related way to describe what they view
as the increased significance of interdisciplinary work in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
The Decline of the Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HAKv. L. REv. 761, 778-79

(1987). Whatever disagreement people may have about its exact meaning, it is important to note that
(a) the term means something now that it did not mean twenty years ago, (b) many more people are
using it, in more than casual ways, to describe what they are doing, and (c) the various ways they
continue to use it seem to coalesce around what is being brought to law by the New Scholarship.
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Legal Theory simply tells us that there may be other ways to understand
things that we, as lawyers, already know, other ways to understand what
lawyers need to know and learn, and other ways to predict what lawyers will
say These are not things that push us apart, but things that bring us together.
They show us things that we share that we might not otherwise know If this
mosaic really existed, then all of us should be able to learn about law more
easily than we have been doing, and that should be of interest to law teachers,
law students, and legal practitioners alike.

B. Then and Now-Packing and Unpacking the Common Law
If such a mosaic no longer exists-as seems clear from a reading of the
cases 29 -it also matters. In 1937, the constitutional foundation of Classical

29. The story, in fact, is a familiar one. The pieces are familiar to lawyers, but not how they fit
together. A brief, conceptual outline-all of which happens in 1937 or shortly thereafter-might go
something like this:
(1) General Breakdown of Spheres. The end of Federal/State spheres is illustrated, for example, in
the demise of (a) dual sovereignty generally, (b) denvative immunity in the area of intergovernmental
immunities, (c) the Tenth Amendment as a significant limit on federal regulation, and (d) the rise of
federal power to regulate local matters under the Commerce Clause. The end of the State/Individual
spheres is illustrated by the demise of substantive due process. The related demise of the assumption
that each actor is autonomous within its own area (and that there is one place for each power) is
illustrated by the nse of balancing tests, both for the Federal/State spheres (for example, under the
Commerce Clause) and for the State/Individual spheres (just about everything). The demise of equal
footing is repudiated in increased displacement of state power through preemption.
(2) The Breakdown of the FederalismTest (physical things that are moving between states). This can
be seen in (a) the change to the "effect" test under the federal commerce power, (b) the end of the
manufacturing/commerce distinction, (c) the end of the direct/indirect (that is, physical slowing down)
test for state interference with interstate commerce, (d) the end of the original package doctrine for state
taxation of interstate commerce, and (e) the rise of the multiple burdens concept in state taxation of
interstate commerce.
(3) The Breakdown ofCommon-Law Liberalism as Something that "Goes Without Saying." This can
be traced in such vaned matters as allowing the redistribution of wealth, changing of bargaining power,
and regulation of the market as seen through such changes as (a) the power of both the federal and state
governments to regulate the economy, along with a growth in the commerce power and the demise of
substantive due process, (b) the demise of the "public" purpose as a significant limit to the Takings
Clause, (c) the end of the Contract Clause as a serious limit on regulation of private contracts, and (d)
the end of delegation as a serious limit on granting power to administrative agencies.
(4) The Breakdown of the Role of the Court.The Court no longer polices the spheres, as shown by
its quick retreat from exercising judicial review whenever it involved striking down anything in (1), (2),
or (3) above. Similarly, it no longer upholds the content of common-law liberalism as evidenced by
allowing arguments that would have been noncontestable under common-law liberalism. Instead of
categorizing, it uses balancing tests or process tests.
(5) The Breakdown of the Mediating Concepts Used by the Court to Label the Content ofthe Spheres.
Some concepts are virtually abandoned (such as substantive due process). Others are drastically
reinterpreted (such as police power, Tenth Amendment, Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, Due Process
Clause as applied to economic legislation, and Equal Protection Clause as applied to economic
legislation and class legislation). The public/private distinction blurs as evidenced in such areas as state
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common-law thought collapsed. On March 29, 1937,30 the mosaic shattered.
What happened in 1937 was not that common-law liberalism suddenly became
less coherent. What happened-and suddenly-was that common-law
liberalism simply no longer went without saying. It was not that the principles
and pieces of common-law liberalism were banished from public life as
untrue, or suddenly became illegitimate. It was just that common-law
liberalism was no longer necessarily legitimate in our world.3' From that
point on, the spheres no longer existed, common-law liberalism no longer
went without saying, and the Supreme Court, for whatever reason, no longer
acted as it once did. The Court, judicial review, and constitutional law have
not been the same since. 32 The common law, lawyers, and legal thought have
not been the same since either.
The common law we have today is not the common law of Classical
common-law thought. Many of the names may be the same, but much of the
content and character of the categories is not. In 1937, the key elements that
came together to create Classical common-law thought came apart.33 In 1937,

action, what constitutes "public" for purposes of the Takings Clause or for purposes of price regulation,
and allowing redistribution of wealth.
This is but a start, but the picture should be clear. This is not a series of unrelated changes in
doctrine. This happened as a unit, this happened suddenly, and perhaps most important, once it
happened, there was a clean break.
30. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Pamsh, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
31. See Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politicsof the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to Modern
Legal Thought, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 871, 893-904 (1986).
32. Before 1937, the spheres and common-law liberalism determined when the Court would exercise
judicial review. After 1937, with these familiar landmarks gone, the Court had to reconstruct-from top
to bottom-when it would exercise judicial review. That process remains an ongoing affair. The
meaning of the events of 1937 has become a central issue for lawyers ever since. For starters, while I
do not believe that the infamous footnote four of Carolene Products is a satisfactory answer, I do
believe that it was far from mere happenstance that it was written in 1938. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (dictum).
33. Two critical issues on which I disagree with Duncan Kennedy, Morton Horwitz, and John
Schlegel are how I would explain (a) the exact content of the spheres and (b) why the three spheres are
no longer in place. Both are related to how each of us interprets the meaning of the events of 1937.
I believe that the existence of the spheres and their link to the substantive values of common-law
liberalism created largely determinate and predictable results until 1937, both for what it meant for the
role of the Court and for what it meant for lawyers, law schools, and the structure of common-law
thought Then, a sudden, sharp change occured in 1937 that shattered the spheres, challenged the deep
assumptions of common-law liberalism, and, in the process, fractured the foundations of Classical
common-law thought, leaving us to limp along in a new world. Common-law liberalism did not
suddenly become less coherent in 1937, it just suddenly no longer went without saying.
Kennedy, Horwitz, and Schlegel do not think that 1937 is important. As a consequence, they see the
law of the Civil War-to-1937 period as far less coherent and laden with any number of opposing and
irreconcilable distinctions. They also attribute much of the state of modem legal thought to a gradual,
intellectual change led by the Realists. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205 (1979); Kennedy, Form and Substance,
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the Court ceased being a common-law court. The common law that it had
helped create and monitor was set adrift. The impact is still with us.
When cut free from the underlying standards of common-law liberalism, the
once proud mainstays of Classical common-law thought had to find new
moorings. So long as transactional justice, equality of will, and isolated
autonomy went without saying, so would bipolar lawsuits, freedom of
contract, and private property Most important, so long as the deep assumptions of common-law liberalism remained in place, the legal culture could
safely build contracts around "promise," property around "things," and torts
around "fault." Now this was not so clear. Cut free from the moorings of
common-law liberalism, the once-proud mediating concepts of property,
contract, and tort gradually began to shrink and drift, trying to find their place
in the new political landscape, ever less able to fend off the incursions of new
rivals (for example, administrative agencies) and the expanded power of old
ones (for example, legislative bodies).
Cut free from the underlying assumptions about the spheres and the notions
of territoriality associated with them, other mediating concepts had to face
new problems. People, we are soon told, can be in more than one place at a
time,34 and Civil Procedure is left to struggle with that fact. 35 Torts or
contracts do not necessarily happen in one place3 6 and Conflict of Laws is
left to struggle with what that can mean.3" Cut free from the notions of
exclusive functions and clear boundaries between state and federal courts, new

supra note 4; Schlegel, supra note 7.
In this context, whether the spheres disappeared suddenly and whether they did so at the same time
that common-law liberalism no longer went without saying are important for three reasons. First, if this
event can be located in a particular point in time, it would discount the argument that development of
modem legal thought is just the result of a gradual change in the conceptions of the intellectual elite
in the legal profession. Second, it would also make it unnecessary to argue that Classical common-law
thought was incoherent or indeterminate as a precondition to saying that it should not be followed now.
Third, it would seem to support Bruce Ackerman's theory of transformative politics. See, e.g., Bruce
A. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989).
34. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316-19 (1945) (holding that minimum
contacts replaces physical presence).
35. See 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
1067-1067.1 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) (collecting cases on modem jurisdiction).
36. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-378 (1934) (using place of wrong
in torts) and id. § 311 (using place of contracting for contract) and id. §§ 355-357 (using place of
performance for contract) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (noting
place of wrong no longer used), § 186 (noting place of performance no longer used) and id. § 145
introductory note at 412-14 (rejecting vested rights approach) and id. § 186 introductory note at 557-58
(same).
37. See Gene R. Shreve, Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1672, 1673-77
(1992) (reviewing DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
(1990)) (survey of the problem).
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alignments of power also had to be found. We are also told in short order that
the common law in the federal courts is no longer the exclusive province of
the federal government,38 that just because the federal government can do
something does not mean that the states cannot,39 and that the federal
government cannot be prevented from regulating large parts of daily life.4"
The response of legal academics to all of this has been less than daring.
When pressed to authenticate the old forms (and, -arguably, to justify the
continuation of their tenure), legal academics have tried to prop up the falling
edifice. They have kept many of the same names and even some of the same
pieces, but it never really was the same again. We are told that the modern
role of private bargaining in a regulatory state was really about "contracts,"
yet when we want to cover any problem that cleanly presented these
issues-such as labor relations, insurance, and consumer protection-and
which would, by implication, present a facial challenge to what went without
saying in common-law liberalism, we are told that they are "different"
courses. We are told as well that the complex regulatory and ethical issues
that surround the inevitable choices about risk and injury in modern life are
really about "torts," yet environmental law, legislation, insurance, and
administrative law are not required courses. We are told this, just as we are
told that "consideration" (the guarantee of a market transaction in commonlaw liberalism) has "really" been about "reliance" all along,4' or that the
information-gathering activities so necessary (and so new) to the regulation
of risk in
society are "really" about the familiar and venerable doctrine of
"cause." 42 It is little wonder that legal academics have been charged with
lacking a coherent intellectual vision.

38. See Ene R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common

law.').
39. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) ("It is no objection to the assertion
of the [federal] power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents
which attended the exercise of the police power of the states."); see also South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-91 (1938) (holding direct state regulation of commerce no
longer necessarily invalid).
40. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (discussing conditions of

daily work); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (concerning retirement); Wickard v.
Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (discussing food grown for own consumption).
41. The standard cite for this has become Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis.
1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (regarding promissory estoppel);
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972) (regarding unconscionable contracts in commercial transactions).
42. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, ConcerningCause and the Law ofTorts: An EssayforHarry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1975) (discussing cost-spreading and deterrence functions of traditional

notions of "but for" and "proximate cause"); see also Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and
the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 711, 715-28 (1983) (contrasting role of
cause in transactional justice versus distributive justice frameworks).
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In such a world, what we call the common law takes on entirely new
meanings. Most important, we can no longer assume that the questions the
Classical common-law categories helped us ask and the things they helped us
see are always what we need to see today We can no longer assume that what
we need to be able to see is what conventional interpretations of conventional
categories allow us to see.
In short, understanding what happened in 1937 matters-a lot, It matters
because reconstructing what happened to us then may explain why we are
having trouble seeing what is around us now If the dominant mediating
concepts taught in law schools are the product of a different political era, then
we, as lawyers, are asking an inordinate number of wrong questions. If the
mediating concepts still promoted as fundamental and basic in American law
schools are best understood as the product of common-law liberalism, then the
intellectual and political baggage they still carry with them needs to be talked
about. Finally, the problems of legitimacy we are now facing may have more
to do with the mediating concepts we are still trying to use than with the
questions we are now trying to ask. While the first generation of post-New
Deal academics might be excused for lack of vision (after all, it took Langdell
several decades to get established), the second generation cannot be as easily
excused.
C. Then and Now-Unpacking the Future
That such a mosaic as Classical common-law thought could ever have
existed also matters. It matters to us now because something like what
happened then may also be happening now Within the legal culture, it is
increasingly clear that there is an Old Scholarship and a New Scholarship. 3
The Old Scholarship was the intricate case analysis and doctrinal work
associated with the common law The central question of-the Old Scholarship
was the study of adjudication. The central institution was the appellate court;
the central datum was the appellate opinion; and the central players were
lawyers. In turn, the definitive lawyerly skills were case analysis and
manipulation of common-law categories.

43. See Gjerdingen, supra note I (contrasting Conventionalism and Legal Theory scholarship); see
also Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983) (contrasting
reactive lawyenng with Constructivism); Edward L. Rubin, The Concept ofLaw and the New Public
Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792 (1991) (contrasting old scholarship with new public law
scholarship); Richard A. Posner, Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 38
U. TORONTO L.J. 333 (1988) (contrasting conventionalist with interdisciplinary legal theory). A nice
survey of many of the problems that this raises for legal scholarship is Edward L. Rubin, The Practice
and Discourseof Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (1988).
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The New Scholarship, in its many versions, takes issue with one or more
44
of these assumptions. Under the various banners of Law & Economics,
Constructivsm, 4 and Critical Legal Studies, 46 along with Law & Literature, 47 Feminist Jurisprudence, 4 and Critical Race Theory 49 questions are
now common about the relationship between law and politics. And Richard
Posner can write in the 100th anniversary issue of the HarvardLaw Review

about "The Decline
of the Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987" as
50

an accepted fact.
The debate between the Old and the New Scholarship is more fundamental
and far-reaching than previously has been supposed. The raised voices are
symptoms of something more. Implicated in the debate is a redefinition of the
dominant American concept of law 51 Implicated in the debate is a battle
between two different concepts of law, one that created modem legal
education and one that is in the process of transforming it. At issue, once
again, are the boundaries of what is considered law, the categories and
techniques of proper legal argument, and the legitimacy of what lawyers do.

44. See, e.g., ROBIN P. MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1990) (discussing link between legal and economic ideology); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992) (presenting law according to the Chicago school of Law
& Economics).
45. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (proposing Constructivism as an alternative to Critical Legal Studies and to Chicago school of Law & Economics).
46. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990)
(collecting examples of Critical Legal Studies work); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) (providing overview of Critical Legal Studies by one of its intellectual
leaders).
47. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988)
(discussing interpretive technique and normative legal argument); Robin L. West, Law, Literature,and
the Celebrationof Authority, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 977 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)) (discussing link between legal liberalism, authority,
and critique).
48. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (noting
separation of emotion and reason in traditional legal thought); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal
Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcoming 1993) (contrasting epistemology of feminist
legal thought with traditional Cartesianism forms). See generally ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS
AND HUMAN NATURE (1983) (discussing impact of feminist thought on political theory).
49. See, e.g., Kevin D. Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools: The Paradox
Created by Law's Conception of Race and Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (arguing
that traditional models of liberal legalism do not allow open talk about social practice of racism);
Charles IR Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and EqualProtection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing blending of racism into deep structure of society).
50. See Posner, supra note 28. "Until [the early 1960s] the autonomy of legal thought was the
relatively secure, though periodically contested, premise of legal education and scholarship. It is no
longer." Id. at 761.
51. See Gjerdingen, supra note I (contrasting Conventionalism with modem theory of law).
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If that is the case, then the mosaic of Classical common-law thought may
be of use to us. Not for what it says about the fine points of what happened
over a century ago, but for what it may say anew about the relationship
between substance and procedure today, about what "goes without saying" in
the world in which we live, and about the link between the kinds of categories
and techniques the New Scholarship is now exploring and the questions that
thinking lawyers need to ask. It may well be that after 150 years we have
come full circle.

